This article addresses how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency has been implemented and interpreted in the US and UK. The Model Law has attained a measure of international acceptance and is intended to achieve greater efficiencies in the administration of insolvency cases with transnational dimensions. But different manners of implementation in different countries and differing interpretations may hinder the prospects for harmonization and coordination of laws. The paper will address in particular whether US interpretations differ from those in the UK and whether the US decisions are so infused with 'American exceptionalism' that they cannot be relied upon as sure guides in other countries.
In addressing these issues, the paper is divided into six substantive sections followed by a general conclusion. The first section looks at general Model Law philosophy and the role of the Model Law within the national bankruptcy firmament.9 The second section considers the COMI test for the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. The third section considers timing and the jurisdictional tests; in particular at what point of time the application for recognition should meet the threshold requirements. The fourth section considers another jurisdictional hurdle apparently erected by the US courts -the need for the applicant for recognition to qualify as a 'debtor' under the US Bankruptcy Code. The fifth section addresses the availability of relief consequent on recognition under Chapter 15 and in particular whether the application of foreign insolvency law is permitted. The sixth section considers the application by the US courts of the public policy qualification on recognition and relief. In all of these sections, the paper will consider whether, and to what extent, US interpretations of the Model Law mirror those adopted in the UK; whether the US decisions are inspired by peculiarly US concerns and relatedly, whether the US decisions should be followed in other countries. In the general conclusion, the responses to the three research question are considered and reviewed.
The Model Law Philosophy and its relationship to national law provisions
This section will consider the general structure and principles of the Model Law; how its underlying philosophy has been understood in the US; how the Model Law has been incorporated in the US through Chapter 15 and whether this understanding and incorporation (a) matches that in other countries particularly the UK and (b) consequently is of sound precedential value for other countries.10
The Model Law provides for the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and for extending cooperation to foreign courts and foreign insolvency representatives. Foreign proceedings may be either 'main' or 'non-main'. Foreign main proceedings are defined as proceedings taking place in the state where the debtor has its centre of main interests ('COMI') and non-main proceedings where the debtor has an 'establishment'.11 Once foreign main proceedings are recognised, there is generally a stay on proceedings against the debtor or its assets; execution proceedings against the debtors' assets are barred and the right of the debtor to dispose of assets is suspended.12 Additional 'appropriate' relief may also be granted by the recognising court as a matter of discretion.13 In respect of foreign non-main proceedings, there are no automatic consequences of recognition but the court is empowered, on a discretionary basis, to grant all the kinds of relief that it could have granted in relation to foreign main proceedings.
This principle of recognition and cooperation extends both to traditional liquidation type procedures of the kind found in Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code and restructuring proceedings of the kind found in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.14 The Model Law is however, a less ambitious instrument than the EU Insolvency Regulation.15Under the Regulation recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings opened elsewhere in the EU is automatic rather than dependent on application to the court which is the case under the Model Law. The Regulation in Articles 4-15, unlike the Model Law, also contains mandatory uniform rules on conflict of laws. It is specifically stated that the law of the State which opens insolvency proceedings applies to those proceedings, subject to certain exceptions, but there is no such statement in the Model Law. Moreover, the Regulation directly allocates jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings whereas under the Model Law regime, national implementing legislation makes it clear that existing jurisdictional rules remain in place.16
The mere fact that a company may have assets or even its centre of main operations in a particular State does not necessarily mean that that the courts of that State have the jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings in a particular case. It depends on the relevant national law.
Be that as it may, one could argue that both the Model Law and the European Insolvency Regulation adopt an approach of 'mitigated universalism'.17 The assumption in each case is that of unitary insolvency proceeding for each debtor, with universal scope but, in addition, there may be territorial insolvency proceedings with the effects of those proceedings restricted to the assets of the debtor in that territory. Moreover, and despite its limitations, the Model Law should nevertheless lead to greater efficiencies in administering the affairs of same assets would be if spread to the winds. It is often referred to as the surplus of a going concern value over a liquidation value.'
The Model Law provides for the possibility of additional relief and for enhanced cooperation between insolvency representatives in different countries. In these respects, it should also mitigate the so-called 'anti-commons' problem. By this is meant blocking actions by individual creditors with a view to frustrating the wishes of the majority.21
The US court in ABC Learning Centres Ltd expounded somewhat on these themes referring to what it saw as the underlying 'universalist' philosophy of the Model Law and contrasting it with a value-destructive 'territorialist' approach. From the Bear Stearns case, it appears that COMI is determined by where the most material contacts are to be found, especially management direction and control of assets. These contacts 'include the location of the debtor's headquarters, the location of those who actually manage the debtor, the location of the debtor's primary assets, the location of a majority of the debtor's creditors or of a majority of creditors who would be affected by the case and the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes'.47
The concept of "principal place of business" is a familiar notion in US domestic Member State where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that its economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not enough to rebut 48 (2006) company's liquid assets were located in the US. The only business done in the Caymans, it appears, were those acts necessary to maintain the status of the company as a registered Cayman company. If these facts were present in an EU regulation context, the court would surely be justified in concluding that the registered office equals COMI presumption would be rebutted, even if it were given some weight.59
In conclusion, US decisions on the 'COMI' test for main insolvency proceedings are useful and influential in other jurisdictions that have enacted the Model Law but their value as precedents in the UK is somewhat limited by the influence of the jurisprudence on the European Insolvency Regulation.
Timing -and the relevant foreign proceedings.
The next section will consider the provenance and influence of US decisions on another "gateway" issue; namely the timing of the relevant foreign proceedings. In deciding on a recognition application, the question arises as to the point at which the 'COMI' or 'establishment' should be made -at the time of the commencement of the relevant foreign proceedings or at the time of the application for recognition. There is much to be said for the view that the most logical and convenient time for making the determination is the time of the commencement of the relevant foreign proceedings. Making the determination with reference to the time of commencement of the foreign insolvency proceeding would create a universally fixed time and lead to greater certainty in the process of deciding on recognition applications in different foreign courts.
In Re Fairfield Sentry Ltd60the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held however, that COMI should be determined on the basis of the debtor's activities at, or around, the time of filing of the Chapter 15 petition. The decision adds to the ability of a foreign party to plan its crossborder insolvency strategy but the court also entered a cautionary note stating that where there was an allegation that COMI had been manipulated in bad faith, it could review the period between the commencement of the foreign proceedings and the application for recognition.
In Fairfield Sentry the economic activity undertaken by the debtor was entirely in New York but it had ceased economic activity by the time that the Chapter 15 petition was filed. It instituted insolvency proceedings in its place of incorporation, namely, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and these proceedings were pending for some time before an application for recognition was made under Chapter 15. The court granted the application on the basis that the debtors' COMI had become located in the BVI and the date of the filing of the Chapter 15 petition was the relevant date for determining the location of COMI. Against the decision in the case, one might argue that recognition as 'non-main' insolvency proceedings requires the carrying out of some real economic activity61 and it follows, a fortiori, that a COMI determination requires even more economic activity.
The decision makes it easier for foreign proceedings to achieve recognition in the US if there is any significant interval between the commencement of the foreign proceedings and the 60 (2013) In conclusion, it is submitted that the Drawbridge decision is likely to be of minimal significance in other jurisdictions such as the UK since its whole rationale derives from specifically American concerns.
Relief consequent on the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings including use of foreign law
The next issue to be considered is the relief that flows from the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. This is also an area where US decisions owe much to peculiarly US Under Article 20 of the Model Law, recognition of foreign main insolvency proceedings has three automatic consequences. There is an automatic stay on individual proceedings against the debtor or its assets; a stay on executions against the debtor's assets and thirdly, the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor is suspended. The stay and suspension is however, expressly stated to be subject to whatever limitations that are part and parcel of domestic insolvency law. Article 20 is supplemented by Article 21 which applies whether the foreign proceedings are 'main' or 'non-main'. It allows appropriate relief to be given as a matter of discretion and this 'appropriate' relief can take the form, inter alia, of:
(1) providing for the examination of witnesses, the taking of evidence or the delivery of information concerning the debtor's assets, affairs, rights, obligations or liabilities; The US courts have inferred extra-territorial effect from the general language of the "stay"
provision in s 362 and also from s 541 which defines property of the bankruptcy estate to include property belonging to the debtor 'wherever located and by whomever held'. It has been held that the bankruptcy estate comprises all the debtor's property, in whatever part of the globe it is located,68and that the opening of bankruptcy proceedings under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Code triggers an automatic worldwide automatic stay on proceedings against the debtor and its property.69This stay bars all actions by creditors, wherever situated, on pain of sanctions for contempt of the US court.70 The long arm of the US bankruptcy jurisdiction coupled with the global economic reach of the US means than foreign creditors can ill-afford to ignore US bankruptcy proceedings. It is only where they their assets or connections in the US are completely non-existent that they are safe from the automatic stay.71
Section 1520(a)(1) provides that upon the recognition of foreign main proceedings, an automatic stay operates 'with respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States'. Nevertheless, it has been argued, on the basis of the general bankruptcy code provisions, that the automatic stay should extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the US in Chapter 15 cases in the same way that it does in fully fledged bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 7 or 11. This argument was considered by the bankruptcy court in JSC BTA Bank72 but it was held that, as a general rule, the stay should not apply extraterritorially.
The court took a 'plain meaning' interpretation of s 1520(a)(1) and ruled that, while the provision stayed actions against a foreign debtor within the US, it only applied outside the US to the extent that such actions affected property of the debtor within US territorial The court said that recognition of foreign main proceedings under Chapter 15 should not become, by operation of law, a worldwide anti-suit injunction in respect of any proceedings, regardless of subject matter, that may be pending or threatened against the foreign debtor in whatever country. This result was said to be clearly at odds with the legislative intent behind
Chapter 15. The court suggested that the concept of territorial jurisdiction was an essential element in promoting cooperation and greater legal certainty in cross-border cases. The
Chapter 15 stay was held to apply for all purposes to the debtor within the US and might extend to the debtor in respect of proceedings in other jurisdictions for the purpose of protecting the debtor's property within US territorial jurisdiction. In this particular case, the action sought to be stayed -a Swiss arbitration -had 'no connection to the United States and no conceivable impact on debtor property in this country'.74 The court did however state that irrespective of its venue in another country, arbitration proceedings with different facts involving a determination of third party rights in the US located property of a foreign debtor would be subject to the automatic stay under s 1520(a)(1). 78 According to In re Lionel Corp (1983) 722 F 2d 163 at 1071 a judge is required to find from the evidence a good business reason to approve the sale though the bankruptcy court is said to have broad discretion and flexibility to enhance the value of the estate before it.. Salient factors include whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value.
It had transpired that by the time of the US hearing, the assets were worth significantly more than they appeared to be worth at the time of the agreement for sale and, in a bout of vendor's remorse, the foreign liquidator asked the US court not to approve the sale on the basis that it was no longer prudent. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals were sympathetic to this line of argument and held that a s 363 standard of review was appropriate.
The court essentially adopted a 'plain meaning' interpretation of Chapter 15 and in particular s 1520(a)(2) which provides, inter alia, that s 363 applies to a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property that is within US territorial jurisdiction. The court held that once the territorial prerequisite had been met, the sale must be reviewed under s 363 to the same extent as it would be under Chapter 11, without regard to whether principles of comity would require deference to a decision of the foreign court approving the sale.
The decision however, could be criticised on the basis that it conflicts with the primacy of the foreign main insolvency proceedings. The Chapter 15 proceedings are ancillary proceedings and intended to assist the court in the foreign main proceedings. On this basis, the value that creditors will receive and the appropriateness of a particular sale should be a function of the court in the main proceedings and not of the US court in Chapter 15.
If the same fact situation were to recur in a UK context then it is submitted that Krys v Farnum Place LLC79 would be a relevant, though not necessarily a controlling, precedent. Art 20(6) provides that the court may modify or terminate a suspension of the debtor's power to dispose of assets on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit. The courts would recognise the title to corporate assets of a foreign liquidator and a legally binding contract to sell such assets entered into by the liquidator. If however, the sale agreement was made subject to the sanction of the UK Court, it is likely that the court would hold that the apply the law of the foreign proceeding, intended to bring back in such a power under the general wording which refers to "any appropriate relief"''. proceedings. The court took the view that Chapter 15 permitted the application of foreign insolvency law; referring to the fact that debtors might otherwise be tempted to hide assets in the US out of the reach of the foreign jurisdiction. The court adverted to the cost and inconvenience of full US bankruptcy proceedings which, in any event, were statutorily prohibited in this case. It observed that the US Congress had not explicitly barred all avoidance actions from whatever source -an easy step to take had it wished to do so.91
The court also referred to the 'helpful marriage of avoidance and distribution whether the proceeding is ancillary applying foreign law or a full proceeding applying domestic law-a marriage that avoids the more difficult . . . rules of conflict law presented by avoidance and distribution decisions governed by different sources of law'.92It suggested that this solution met the concern that foreign representatives might bring an ancillary action simply to gain access to avoidance powers not provided by the relevant foreign law. This interpretation of Chapter 15 was said to be consistent with judicial interpretation of the predecessor provision Fourthly, the Condor decision effectively permits foreign representatives to "Chapter shop".
The foreign representative would seek to bring Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding when seeking exclusively to use foreign law, and Chapter 7 or 11 proceedings when using US domestic avoidance law.
The Condor decision is conceptually neat and brings benefits to foreign representatives by enhancing possible asset recoveries. Nevertheless, the decision does not sit very well with the structure of Chapter 15 which seems designed to keep a tight grip on avoidance actions by foreign representatives through confining use of US avoidance law to fully blown US 94 (1987) bankruptcy proceedings. Neither does Condor discuss the possibility of using US law as a "shield" when a transaction is challenged under foreign avoidance law pursuant to Chapter 15. If the transaction out of which a disputed transfer arises was governed by US law, and US law does not allow the transfer to be set aside, it is very questionable whether a US court would allow the settled expectations of the parties to be disturbed on the basis of foreign law.
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In the UK, the courts have taken a different view from the US courts and held that Chapter 15
does not authorise the application of foreign insolvency law. In Re Pan Ocean Co Ltd99the court recognised that the words 'appropriate relief' in Art 21 had a wide literal meaning but the very width of their literal meaning led to the conclusion that a broad interpretation was inappropriate. The court considered the preliminary materials leading to the elaboration of the Model Law and it appeared from these documents that a recognising court was not authorised to grant relief that it could not grant in a domestic insolvency.100
The allowing the Brazilian party to terminate the contract in certain events, including if the shipper entered insolvency proceedings. The shipper entered insolvency proceedings in Korea and the Brazilian party wished to activate the termination provision. The shipper's insolvency representative, on the other hand, sought to keep the contract alive because it was quite profitable for the shipper and under Korean insolvency law, unlike the UK, termination clauses of this type could apparently be overridden. Morgan J concluded that even if he had the power to do so, it would not be appropriate in this particular case to give effect to the provisions of Korean insolvency law. The parties would be surprised if an English court applied Korean insolvency law to their substantive rights under a contract which they had agreed should be governed by English law.102
In concluding this section, one might argue that US decisions are of some value abroad in relation to the relief that is available following the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. Moreover, the jurisprudence is quite 'internationalist' by permitting, in certain circumstances, the application of foreign law in a Chapter 15 context. Nevertheless, this particular interpretation can be explained on the basis of the distinctive legislative context in the US; namely, the fact that US transactional avoidance law has been shut off to foreign insolvency representatives whereas in the UK the foreign representative is empowered, on the same basis as domestic insolvency office holders, to institute transactional avoidance actions.103Therefore, it does not quite have the same significance as might first appear.
Public Policy
Under this heading, the paper considers how the public policy qualification on recognition and relief under the Model Law has been interpreted and applied in the US and UK. The Model Law states that nothing in the Law prevents the court from refusing to take an action that would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the enacting State. Section 1506 of the US Bankruptcy code reproduces this provision more or less exactly as does the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations Schedule 1, Article 6 in the UK. The exception provides States with potentially a lot of leeway to avoid recognising foreign insolvency proceedings for, as UNCITRAL itself has recognised, the "notion of public policy is based on national law and accordingly may differ from State to State".104 Moreover, in some States the notion of "public policy" is given a broad interpretation and can relate to any mandatory rules of national law. But in other States, the notion may be restricted to fundamental legal principles such as constitutional guarantees and recognition would only be refused where there is an infringement of those fundamental principles.
The scope for divergence between States in the application of the public policy criterion is compounded in the insolvency field. Bankruptcy policies and procedures differ substantially between States and Lord Millett has gone so far as to say that no branch of the law "is moulded more by considerations of national economic policy and commercial philosophy".105 Countries may differ on the parties that may be subject to bankruptcy proceedings; the scope of such proceedings; the procedures employed in adjudicating claims that arise in the course of such proceedings and the effect of any discharge of debts. On one view, these are simple matters of civil procedure that may be the subject of legitimate disagreement between and within States. On another view, they involve fundamental matters the fore in Re Toft107 where a debtor was the subject of insolvency proceedings in Germany and the German courts authorised mail interception. The insolvency representative initiated Chapter 15 proceedings to gain access to the debtor's email accounts that were stored on the servers of two internet service providers in the US. An English court recognised and gave effect to the German order holding that it was in the public interest and necessary in a democratic society to intercept the bankrupt's communications because otherwise bankrupts might be able to evade bankruptcy trustees and avoid paying their creditors. 108 The US Bankruptcy Court however, took the view that recognising the German order would be manifestly contrary to US public policy since it would infringe US constitutional safeguards that protected the safety of electronic communications.
The US courts have said however, in cases including Re Toft, that a restrictive view should be taken of the public policy exception. The use of the word 'manifestly' limited it to exceptional circumstances implicating the most fundamental policies of the United States.
These judicial statements have also been carried though in practice.109 For example, in Re ABC Learning Centres,110 it was held that Australian proceedings were not manifestly contrary to US public policy and could be recognised under Chapter 15 even if they allowed creditors with security over all the debtor's assets to retain these assets rather than providing for the general administration of creditor claims with distributions accordingly. full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting', the judgment should be enforced and the matter not tried all over again.
This point was reiterated and reinforced in Re Board of Directors of Hopewell
International112 where the court said that if the foreign proceedings are in 'a sister common law jurisdiction with procedures akin to our own, comity should be extended with less hesitation, there being fewer concerns over the procedural safeguards employed in those foreign proceedings.'
The US and Canada share the same common law traditions and fundamental legal principles that afford creditors a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Consequently, US courts have repeatedly granted comity to Canadian proceedings even though bankruptcy law and procedure is not exactly on all fours in the US and Canada. A case in point is Re Ephedra113 where the US courts recognised and enforced in the US a claims resolution procedure ordered by a Canada court even though the procedure made no provision for jury trial which would have been the norm had the matter been the subject of plenary proceedings in the US.
One of the areas for potential disagreement between the US and Canada concerns bankruptcy orders that permit third parties to be relieved from liability for certain actions. A US court 111 (1895 ) 159 US 113 at 202-03. 112 (1999 ) 238 BR 25 at 66 and affirmed (2002 ) 238 BR 699. 113 (2006 remarked in Re Metromedia114 that a 'nondebtor release is a device that lends itself to abuse.
By it, a non-debtor can shield itself from liability to third parties. In form, it is a release; in effect, it may operate as a bankruptcy discharge arranged without a filing and without the safeguards of the Code. The potential for abuse is heightened when releases afford blanket immunity.' Canadian courts appear to grant such releases on a more liberal basis than US courts but nevertheless, US courts have recognised Canadian proceedings with non-debtor releases. Case in point include Re Sino-Forest Corp115 and Metcalfe116 where the court pointed out that the Canadian plan had received near-unanimous creditor support despite the inclusion of the non-debtor releases.
These decisions are to be contrasted with Vitro117 where the relief requested was refused.
There are some similarities between the cases. All three, at least partially, involved nondebtor releases that, as a matter of substantive US law, were not likely to have been approved in Chapter 11. There are also some differences; not least the fact that Sino- relevant considerations. Firstly, the mere fact of conflict between foreign law and US law was not enough. Secondly, there should be no deference to foreign proceedings where the procedural fairness of these proceedings was doubtful and could not be cured by the adoption of additional protections. Thirdly, recourse to the public policy exception was also appropriate to prevent actions that would impinge severely on a US constitutional or statutory right.
In this case, the procedural fairness of the German proceedings was not in question.
Germany was reckoned to have a mature and well-developed system of insolvency law with goals congruent to those of US bankruptcy law, including maximizing returns to creditors and treating equally-situated creditors equally. In addition, aggrieved parties had ready access to a functioning and fair court system to challenge these decisions. The US bankruptcy court held however, that deferring to German law, to the extent that this permitted the cancellation of the US patent licenses, would be manifestly contrary to US public policy. The court acknowledged that terminating the licenses would enhance the value to the debtor's estate124 but it considered that this legitimate interest was outweighed by the risk to the licensees who had invested substantially in research and manufacturing facilities relying on the design freedom provided by the licensing agreements. The court was concerned that terminating the licenses would create uncertainty leading to a slower pace of innovation and detriment to the US economy.125
It might be argued however, that the balance between debtor and creditor interests and also between protecting existing employment as distinct from facilitating the creation of new employment are areas where national governments and national insolvency laws may justifiably take different views. The particular protections afforded by US bankruptcy law are not mirrored around the globe and many countries might find, in particular, the debtor in possession norm reflected in the US Chapter 11 to be somewhat quixotic.126 The bankruptcy court in Qimonda conceded that the balancing of debtor and creditor interests was close. In these circumstances, it hardly seems appropriate to wave the big stick of public policy and refuse the application of German insolvency law. After all, the court specifically mentioned that mere differences in laws between countries were not enough to warrant reliance on public policy.
The Court of Appeals was able to decide the case without reference to public policy.
Essentially the relief requested by the German insolvency representative was an order entrusting him with the administration or realization of all or part of the assets of Qimonda within the territorial jurisdiction of the US and specifically identifying the company's US patents as among the US assets he sought to control. Section 1521(b) states that the debtor's assets located in the US can only be handed over to a foreign representative where the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in the US are sufficiently protected. The Court of Appeals said that the bankruptcy court had a broad latitude to mould relief to the circumstances and the insertion of a proviso safeguarding the rights of patent licensees under US law was considered to be a justified exercise of the power to ensure protection of US creditors.
If the facts of Vitro or Qimonda were to occur in an English context, it is submitted that the English court would come to a broadly similar conclusion through recourse to the 'adequate protection for local creditors' qualification on relief under the Model Law and the Cross-126 The importance of creditor rights in insolvency proceedings including management displacement in favour of an outside administrator was stressed in the 'legal origins' or 'law matters' thesis; on which see R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny 'Legal Determinants of External Finance ' (1997) Nevertheless, if the non-debtor release contained atypical features and/or the requirements for getting the release approved lacked procedural rigour, then it is submitted the court would deny any relief under Article 21 that allowed the release to take effect in England. Article 21 relief is discretionary and needs to be appropriate, and the courts would be wary of measures such as a permanent injunction staying actions against third parties in respect of the debt.132
General conclusion
At the outset, this paper asked three related questions. The first was whether US interpretations of the Model Law provisions differ from those in the UK. On this point, one must conclude that there have seem some significant differences but these stem essentially however, for all that is needed is that the debtor should have property or a place of business in the US and even property moved to the US in anticipation of the bankruptcy filing suffices for this purpose. In some instances, the US/UK differences are more apparent than real. For example, US courts at first instance appear to have been more willing to apply the 'public policy' qualification on recognition of foreign proceedings although this willingness has been tempered on appeal. Therefore, one reaches pretty much the same result as in the UK that the 'public policy' criterion should only be resorted to in very exceptional circumstances.
Another superficial difference lies in the application of the COMI test for the recognition of foreign main insolvency proceedings. The US courts adopt a multi-factor test in the COMI determination with no special weight attached to the location of the registered office. The UK courts, on the other hand, apply a presumption, only rebuttable by firm evidence to the contrary, that COMI equals the location of the registered office. In the vast of majority of cases, especially with companies incorporated in tax-haven 'letterbox' jurisdictions, the two tests are likely to lead to the same outcome.
The US decisions are more controversial however, on when the COMI condition has to be met before the foreign proceedings are recognized. The case law now suggests that the COMI has to be in the relevant foreign jurisdiction at the time of the application for recognition rather than at the time of the opening of the foreign proceedings. There are no UK decisions directly in point but it is submitted that the courts in the UK are not likely to follow their US counterparts. This is because the US approach may lead to different decisions on recognition in different countries, depending on when the application for recognition is made. Moreover, UNCITRAl's revised guide to enactment of the Model Law suggests that in a recognition application, COMI should be considered with reference to the time when the relevant foreign proceedings were opened.
The second research question set out in the introduction to this paper can be answered in the affirmative. US Chapter 15 decisions have taken account of appropriate foreign decisions.
For instance, even though the function and form of the COMI test is somewhat different under Chapter 15 than it is under the EU Insolvency Regulation, the leading European Court of Justice case on COMI; namely Eurofood133, has been cited in numerous Chapter 15 cases.
Moreover, and on a related point, it seems that, despite the prognostications of certain commentators134, the enactment of chapter 15 has increased the willingness of US courts to satisfied. This has led to a revision of UNCITRAL's Guide to Enactment making it clear that the US interpretation on this point should not be followed in other countries.136
To conclude with a fairly obvious point, the fact that the Model Law has been enacted in both the US and UK does not mean that Cross-Border insolvency law is more or less the same in both US and UK. For a start, while in the US the Model Law is the sole channel for providing assistance in respect of foreign insolvency proceedings, there is a much more fragmented regime for international insolvency co-operation in the UK. In the UK, the 
